Collins v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills and another [2014] EWCA Civ 717, [2014] All ER (D) 44 (Jun)
Sections 11 to 14 of the Limitation Act 1980 struck a balance between the interests of: (i) persons who, having suffered latent injuries, sought compensation late in the day; and (ii) tortfeasors who, despite their wrongdoings, ultimately needed closure. Parliament had struck that balance by means of an objective test.
In the light of the established authorities, s 33(3) of the Act was to be construed in the following manner. First, the period of time which elapsed between a tortfeasor’s breach of duty and the commencement of the limitation period had to be part of “the circumstances of the case” within the meaning of s 33(3). Second, the primary factors to which the court had to have regard were those set out in s 33(3)(a) to (f). Third, although the court would have regard to time elapsed before the claimant’s date of knowledge, the court would accord less weight to that factor. It would treat pre-limitation period effluxion of time as merely one of
