Why do lay judges get it wrong, asks Geoffrey Bindman
“What is truth?’ said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer.” Bacon’s scepticism sums up the problem lawyers face all the time. What is it that persuades a judge to give one answer rather than another? Scholars argue whether there is always a “right” answer. Plainly different views are possible on matters of interpretation and judgment. The fair, just, humane result is often clear enough and trained judges usually find it. I have found in practice, however, that lay tribunals, especially in the academic and professional worlds, are prone to get it wrong.
Even where facts are plain the judicial response to them requires an evaluation of relative significance which involves issues of balance and proportion. When it comes to the consequential action to be directed by the judge, compassion, a sympathetic understanding of human nature, and sheer common sense come into play. When academics and members of the professions face disciplinary confrontations with their institutions, the bodies set up to adjudicate, consisting wholly or mainly of senior colleagues, frequently seem incapable of that dispassionate and
