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15 February 2012 / Hle Blog
Issue: 7501 / Categories: Blogs
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Financial privilege—no case to answer

HLE blogger Will Macgregor examines the recent focus on the convention of financial privilege

"The recent rejection by the House of Commons of various amendments made to the Welfare Reform Bill by the House of Lords has thrown light on the relatively obscure Parliamentary convention of financial privilege. This is the convention that, in simple terms, asserts the primacy of the House of Commons in relation to financial legislation, principally the raising of tax and the appropriation of funds for government spending.

By declaring that financial privilege was involved in certain amendments to the Bill—including the modification of the proposed £26,000 benefits cap—the speaker of the House of Commons enabled the government to extricate the Bill from potentially weeks of to-ing and fro-ing between the Commons and Lords. Once the Commons has rejected a Lords’ amendment involving privilege, the Lords cannot insist on their original amendment (as they would be able to do otherwise), nor would it be constitutional to send back an alternative amendment that would invite the same response. In other words, it’s the end of the matter.

The origins of financial privilege probably date from the 14th century but were confirmed in resolutions of 1671 and 1678 which state that ‘in all aids given to the King by the Commons, the rate of tax ought not to be altered by the Lords’ and claim the ‘undoubted and sole right of the Commons’ to deal with all bills of aids and supplies.

Its deployment in relation to the Welfare Bill was justified on the basis that the amended Bill would have had “large financial implications”, although it’s hard to see exactly how this argument wouldn’t also apply to many other similar Bills past and present. After all, just about any legislative change can be said to have a financial implication…”

To continue reading go to: www.halsburyslawexchange.co.uk

Issue: 7501 / Categories: Blogs
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MOVERS & SHAKERS

Hogan Lovells—Lisa Quelch

Hogan Lovells—Lisa Quelch

Partner hire strengthens global infrastructure and energy financing practice

Sherrards—Jan Kunstyr

Sherrards—Jan Kunstyr

Legal director bolsters international expertise in dispute resolution team

Muckle LLP—Stacey Brown

Muckle LLP—Stacey Brown

Corporate governance and company law specialist joins the team

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