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21 February 2008 / Peter Vaines
Issue: 7309 / Categories: Legal News , Tax , Procedure & practice , Commercial
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Taxing Matters

CAPITAL GAINS TAX: WHO IS A SETTLOR

The case Coombes v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2007] All ER (D) 324 (Nov) was concerned with identifying the settlor of a settlement for capital gains tax purposes. The decision seemed interesting when the initial digest was published and the full text is even more interesting. There was a non resident trust which owned a non resident company. Mr Coombes—who was not the settlor of the trust—put money into the company enabling it to buy a property which it later sold at a huge gain.

HMRC said that Mr Coombes was a settler of the trust because he provided the assets to the company. Therefore the gain made by the company could be attributed to the trust under the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (TCGA 1992), s 13 and subsequently onto him as settler under TCGA 1992, s 86.
Mr Coombes said he was not a settlor of the trust because although he had provided the assets for the company, those assets were not settled property; they belonged to the company and not the trust. The fact that the trustees held the shares in the company was irrelevant. (It will immediately be appreciated that if this argument is right, it completely wrecks the whole of the offshore trust provisions.)
HMRC has always taken the view that the provision of property to a company owned by the trust makes the provider a settlor for income tax and capital gains tax purposes. This is clear from their Statement of Practice SP5/92. However, the High Court did not agree. It said that under TCGA 1992, s 68 “settled property” means “any property held in trust…” and that “a person is a settlor in relation to a settlement, if the settled property consists of or includes property originating from him” (Sch 5(7) TCGA 1992).
 
Property provision
The High Court concluded that Mr Coombes could only be a settlor if part of the property held by the trustees was provided by him or represented property provided by him. The property held by the trustees was only the shares in the company. He did not provide those. Accordingly, no part of the settled property held on the trust of the settlement was provided by him. He just caused those shares to increase in value. Although the land disposed of by the company giving rise to the gain represented the money provided by him, that was not held on any trust arising under the settlement; it was the absolute property of the company.
HMRC complained that such a conclusion effectively destroyed the anti-avoidance provisions but the court was not concerned. The judge observed: “That may be, but that fact does not of course enable me to do violence to the actual provisions of sections 68 and 86 and schedule 5 to the 1992 Act”. Absolutely. Great thinking. Unfortunately his brethren do not generally seem to adopt the same approach—and one needs go no further than the case of Irving v HMRC (see below). Anyway, it is quite impossible for HMRC to accept such a conclusion and an appeal must surely be forthcoming soon—and possibly remedial legislation just in case.
Issue: 7309 / Categories: Legal News , Tax , Procedure & practice , Commercial
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MOVERS & SHAKERS

Hogan Lovells—Lisa Quelch

Hogan Lovells—Lisa Quelch

Partner hire strengthens global infrastructure and energy financing practice

Sherrards—Jan Kunstyr

Sherrards—Jan Kunstyr

Legal director bolsters international expertise in dispute resolution team

Muckle LLP—Stacey Brown

Muckle LLP—Stacey Brown

Corporate governance and company law specialist joins the team

NEWS

NOTICE UNDER THE TRUSTEE ACT 1925

HERBERT SMITH STAFF PENSION SCHEME (THE “SCHEME”)

NOTICE TO CREDITORS AND BENEFICIARIES UNDER SECTION 27 OF THE TRUSTEE ACT 1925
Law firm HFW is offering clients lawyers on call for dawn raids, sanctions issues and other regulatory emergencies
From gender-critical speech to notice periods and incapability dismissals, employment law continues to turn on fine distinctions. In his latest employment law brief for NLJ, Ian Smith of Norwich Law School reviews a cluster of recent decisions, led by Bailey v Stonewall, where the Court of Appeal clarified the limits of third-party liability under the Equality Act
Non-molestation orders are meant to be the frontline defence against domestic abuse, yet their enforcement often falls short. Writing in NLJ this week, Jeni Kavanagh, Jessica Mortimer and Oliver Kavanagh analyse why the criminalisation of breach has failed to deliver consistent protection
Assisted dying remains one of the most fraught fault lines in English law, where compassion and criminal liability sit uncomfortably close. Writing in NLJ this week, Julie Gowland and Barny Croft of Birketts examine how acts motivated by care—booking travel, completing paperwork, or offering emotional support—can still fall within the wide reach of the Suicide Act 1961
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