Elizabeth Morrsion provides an update on the changing world of set-aside applications
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Forcelux Ltd v Binnie [2009] EWCA Civ 854, [2009] All ER (D) 216 (Oct) has altered the landscape in the world of set aside applications, and has done so in the unusual context of considering the meaning of the word “trial”.
It seems that what many of us have always thought of as a trial is not a trial at all, and as a result the criteria for setting aside some judgments have changed, perhaps for the benefit of applicants.
In Forcelux, the claimant freeholder, F, obtained a possession order against a long leaseholder, B, at a hearing, fixed on issue of the claim, which B failed to attend. Although B discovered the existence of the judgment six weeks later, it was not until over five months had elapsed that he (successfully) applied to set aside the order.
F appealed to the Court of Appeal, contending that B’s application was governed by r 39.3, which provides for a party to make
