Neil Parpworth examines the application of the principle of exclusive cognisance
The relationship between Parliament and the courts is of considerable importance to an understanding of the UK’s uncodified constitution. Ever since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, judges have recognised that Parliament is legislatively supreme. More recently, significant constitutional developments, such as the UK’s accession to the EEC (as it then was) and the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, have caused senior judges to note that the legislative supremacy of Parliament is no longer unlimited: see, for example, the remarks of Lord Steyn in R (on the application of Jackson) v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 All ER 1253.
Nevertheless, the power of Parliament to legislate, and the respect which the courts have for laws made by Parliament, remains a highly important feature of the UK’s constitutional arrangements. So, too, does the notion that the three branches of government, the executive, the legislative and the judicial are held in check by the doctrine of the separation of powers. In the recent case of Baron Mereworth v Ministry of Justice [2011]
