Post Hoare, Lucy Wyles, reflects on how courts exercise s 33 discretion
It is now a year since the House of Lords delivered its important judgment in A v Hoare [2008] UKHL 6, [2008] All ER (D) 251 (Jan) in relation to the definition of date of knowledge under s 14 and the exercise of discretion under s 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980). That decision made clear that the proper construction of s 14(2), as to whether or not an injury is significant, involves applying an entirely impersonal standard, rather than considering any particular characteristics of the claimant.
However, guidance was also given as to the appropriate exercise of the s 33 discretion to exclude the time limit; this appears, at least anecdotally, to have resulted in such discretion being exercised more generously in the claimant’s favour in subsequent decisions at first instance.
This trend, of a stricter interpretation of the test for date of knowledge, but a more generous approach to allowing claims to proceed under s 33, is reflected in two recent limitation cases considered by the
