Earl Cadogan and another v Panagopoulos and another [2010] EWCA Civ 1259, [2010] All ER (D) 119 (Nov)
The definition of “common parts” in s 101 of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 was inclusive in form, rather than exhaustive. Thus, it impliedly assumed an ordinary meaning of the expression “common parts”, which was extended or clarified by reference to, first, the structure and exterior of a building, and secondly, any “common facilities” within the building.
The expression “common parts” as such did not appear in the standard dictionaries, although some inferential help was offered by s 4(2) of the Act, which suggested that such things as garages and storage areas were “common parts” if available for shared use, but not if used in conjunction with a particular dwelling. That seemed to accord with the ordinary meaning of the word “common”: that was, for shared, rather than individual, use or benefit. The word “part” in the context of a building connoted a physical division, whether a particular area within the building (such as a garage), or a particular section of its physical constituents.
“Facilities” seemed
