Ian Smith reports on an unusual misconduct dismissal, Tupeland & product placement
As well as a blatant piece of product placement (legal as from last month, see box on p 343), this column concentrates on only two of the considerable number of employment cases reported recently, both of which raised fundamental issues which need the space.
- The first concerned an unusual point on misconduct dismissals—if you have to look at what the employer actually knew as at the date of dismissal, what does a corporate or institutional employer “know”?
- The second addresses a potentially vital issue on TUPE (itself under attack last month politically for “gold plating” the backing directive) as to how it interacts with insolvency laws and provisions.
What does a corporate employer “know”?
The well known rule in Devis & Sons Ltd v Atkins [1977] AC 931, HL normally operates to provide that an employer cannot justify a dismissal as fair on after-acquired evidence. Another way of putting this is that fairness requires evaluation of the employer’s decision to dismiss on its knowledge at the time of dismissal (which
