In his final article, Dermot Feenan explores the place of compassion in legal practice
Compassion is often seen as an emotion, incompatible with law’s reason and objectivity; certainly in adjudication. It is also sometimes seen as irrelevant to practice. Yet, an increasing body of scholarship contends that emotion and reason are not necessarily incompatible. Cognition and emotion are often interlinked. Emotional intelligence has been regarded as an essential aspect of professionalism. Concepts which are sometimes treated as emotions—such as empathy—have been shown to involve deliberative thought, and can stand alongside other reasoned bases for decision-making.
Some judges argue for a role for compassion in judging. And, greater attention is being paid in practice to avoiding causing further suffering—for instance, in cross-examination of vulnerable witnesses.
However, compassion is bedevilled with definitional dispute. Is it an emotion, attribute or principle? To what and whom should it apply, and how? Can it be incorporated into education and training?
Reasoned compassion
Compassion is sometimes defined as the wish or action to alleviate the suffering of another. Some argue that compassion can also be extended to collective
