Keith Patten questions the move towards
criminalising workplace harassment
When the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA 1997) was on its passage through Parliament it was regarded as being aimed principally at two types of anti-social behaviour—namely stalking and “neighbours from hell”. What emerged, however, was an Act of general and (potentially at least) wide application.
The key provision is s 1, which prohibits a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of an individual and which the perpetrator knows, or ought reasonably to know, amounts to harassment. By s 7(3) a course of conduct must include conduct on at least two occasions. PHA 1997 imposes both criminal (s 2) and civil (s 3) liability, in both instances for breaches of s 1.
This would suggest that the differences between criminal harassment and civil harassment is no more than the standard of proof, but that the same conduct will constitute both.
It is apparent from the terms of s 1 that a key question to be asked is “what is the definition of harassment?” PHA 1997 contains no definition, an omission which was deliberate rather than inadvertent. It
