Post-Squier, Chris Pamplin reflects on the use of previous judgments in disciplinary proceedings
- In disciplinary proceedings, is it fair to allow evidence based on judgments where a professional acted as an expert witness and therefore had no opportunity to defend herself?
- A reasonable balance must be struck between probative value and prejudicial risk.
- Squier lays down principles for cases where professionals face disciplinary charges.
The decision to strike from the medical register Dr Waney Squier, a neuropathologist who expressed views in court questioning the existence of shaken baby syndrome, came under scrutiny last year in Squier v General Medical Council [2016] EWHC 2739 (Admin). The case—an appeal against the decision of the Medical Practitioner’s Tribunal of the General Medical Council (GMC)—was examined in a previous issue of NLJ (see ‘Confronting dogma’, 7 April 2017, p 19). Squier raises many issues, notably that of using previous judgments in disciplinary proceedings.
Dr Squier’s views on shaken baby syndrome are considered controversial. Time will tell whether she is a courageous individual taking on the weight of the scientific establishment when others dare
