Khawar Qureshi QC examines recent case law testing the impact of human rights on the arbitral process
In the context of party choice—one of the twin pillars of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996), the other being finality of process—there remains a tension
between ‘ring fencing’ the arbitral process and the extent to which fundamental principles of justice can or should be excluded from that process by the parties choosing to opt out from them. There is a compelling point of principle that arbitration has evolved as a process by virtue of a ‘concession’ by the state to enable parties to contract out of the court process for reasons of commercial expediency.
It is strongly argued by many that arbitration should always be subject to the fundamental principles which underpin most domestic legal systems and ultimately reflect the rule of law—and should not, as some contend, be a process which is totally detached from those fundamental principles. In this
regard, it should be remembered that recourse to domestic legal systems is ultimately the only way in which decisions of arbitral tribunals can be given
